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Abstract 
 
 This report presents new evidence on industry concentration trends in Europe and in North America. 
It uses two novel data sources: representative firm-level concentration measures from the OECD 
MultiProd project, and business-group-level concentration measures using matched Orbis-
Worldscope-Zephyr data. Based on the MultiProd data, it finds that between 2001 and 2012 the 
average industry across 10 European economies saw a 2-3-percentage-point increase in the share of 
the 10% largest companies in industry sales. Using the Orbis-Worldscope-Zephyr data, it documents a 
clear increase in industry concentration in Europe as well as in North America between 2000 and 
2014 of the order of 4-8 percentage points for the average industry. Over the period, about 3 out of 4 
(2-digit) industries in each region saw their concentration increase. The increase is observed for both 
manufacturing and non-financial services and is not driven by digital-intensive sectors. 
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Introduction 
A heated debate is under way about the evolution of industry concentration in OECD 
economies in recent years. A number of studies suggest that industry concentration has 
increased over recent years in the United States (e.g. Furman and Orszag, 2015; Grullon et al., 
2015; Autor et al., 2017b) and to a lesser extent in Japan (Honjo, Doi and Kudo, 2014). 
However, the evidence for other parts of the world is to date limited and inconclusive. Initial 
results for Europe have so far offered little indication of increasing concentration (Valletti et 
al., 2017; Social Market Foundation, 2017; Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2018). This has led some 
economists to suggest that European markets have become more competitive than those in the 
United States (Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2018). 
Understanding trends in industry concentration is important because they can reflect or 
have implications for a range of economic phenomena. Increasing industry concentration may 
indicate technological change or globalisation allowing the most productive firms to expand 
(Autor et al., 2017b). An increasing scale of a few firms may also mean fewer buyers in input 
markets and local labour markets – i.e. monopsony – potentially impacting contractual terms 
for suppliers and workers (OECDa, 2008). In addition, lobbying is more likely to be undertaken 
by larger firms and by firms in concentrated markets, which may inform policy differentially 
in concentrated industries (Dellis and Sondermann, 2017). Last but not least, high concentration 
may impact firm risk-taking behaviour if they can be seen as “too big to fail”. 
Industry concentration is also sometimes seen as a proxy for the degree of competition, 
which, in turn, influences a variety of economic outcomes. Product market competition has 
been shown to be positively correlated with productivity (Disney et al., 2003; Aghion et al., 
2009), particularly for firms far from or close to the frontier (Andrews et al., 2016). Industry 
mark-ups, again a proxy of the degree of competition, can also affect innovation (Aghion et al., 
2005), industry concentration is correlated with income distribution (Siegenthaler and Stucki, 
2015; Autor et al., 2017a,b) and foreign competitors may impact economic volatility (Cravino 
and Levchenko, 2017). 
Industry concentration is related to, but distinct from, the concept of market 
concentration2. Industry concentration measures the extent to which economic activity is 
concentrated within a small number of large companies or business groups within an industry. 
Market concentration, instead, describes the weight of leading firms in a market for particular 
products or services that are close substitutes. Accordingly, market concentration is a far 
2
 Market competition is often the focus of competition authorities. 
2 
narrower definition than what is typically reflected in industry concentration measures. The 
fact that a large share of industry activity is due to a handful of large firms does not necessarily 
mean that product markets within that industry are highly concentrated. While industry 
concentration can be used as an initial indicator to screen for changes in the degree of 
competition, by itself it can say little about whether or not market competition is changing.3 
Looking at a range of additional metrics – such as mark-ups, profitability, mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) activity and business entry and exits – provides a better indication of 
whether there are changes in the competitive environment.4 As we discuss later in this paper, 
these metrics are encompassed within our broader research in this area (see Appendix C in 
particular). 
This paper contributes to the debate by presenting two new complementary pieces of 
evidence on industry concentration trends in Europe and in North America.  
The first piece of evidence consists of representative firm-level concentration measures 
from the OECD MultiProd project.5 We document how the share of the 10% largest companies 
(by sales) has evolved in 10 European economies between 2001 and 2012. We show that the 
share of industry sales due to these firms has increased on average by 2 percentage points in 
manufacturing and 3 percentage points in non-financial market services. The employment share 
of the 10% largest firms (again as defined by their sales) has also increased in services, but not 
in manufacturing. Concentration is measured at the firm-level within each country and 2-digit 
sector. 
The second piece of evidence relies on business-group-level concentration measures 
using matched Orbis-Worldscope data (see Appendix C for an overview of datasets used in this 
paper). Firm-level measures, such as those underlying MultiProd, may understate concentration 
if many firms are actually part of the same business group. In this paper, we explicitly take 
account of some firms being part of larger business groups. Specifically, we rely on the rich 
time-varying ownership information in matched Orbis-Zephyr data to take account of the 
structure of each business group and apportion group sales to the countries and industries where 
3
 The imprecision flows from the fact that to get from industry concentration to market competition one needs to be 
confident that a) there is a reliable relationship between industry concentration and market concentration (see OECD, 
2018, and Werden & Froeb, 2018), b) that market concentration is a good indicator of market power (often not the case 
in differentiated product or geographic markets, platform markets and innovative markets); and c) that market power 
reflects a lack of competitive intensity rather than being a sign of competition in action.  
4
 See OECD (2018) for more detail on the use of industry concentration as a proxy measure of competition intensity.  
The instances of consistency between the changes in industry concentration and the changes in other, more reliable (but 
still individually imperfect) indicators should not be taken to suggest that industry concentration is as reliable as they 
are, at least not without evidence on the systematic correlation of such measures.  
5
 For more information, see http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/multiprod.htm. 
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it operates. We also use information from OECD STAN and OECD SNA data to obtain reliable 
industry sales denominators for our concentration measures. 6 The resulting database covers 22 
countries in Europe and 2 countries in North America, for the period 2000-2014. Concentration 
is measured at the business group-level, treating each global region as a single market, and 
calculated within 2-digit industries.7 
Calculating business-group level metrics has required extensive data work and 
computation time. The “apportioning” approach requires both good financial data for each 
business group and its subsidiaries and detailed information on ownership linkages between 
each subsidiary and their parents over time. Accordingly, we have combined Orbis data on 
business group owners (global ultimate owners), immediate ownership linkages and Zephyr 
data on Mergers and Acquisitions to generate an ownership series for 2.8 million firms that 
extends from 2000 to 2016. We have also supplemented Orbis financial data with data on listed 
firms from Worldscope. In both financial and ownership data, the cleaning included a wide 
range of automatic checks together with manual checks of the largest business groups in each 
industry and world region against their financial statements. See Annex A for more information. 
We document a clear increase in industry concentration in Europe as well as in North 
America between 2000 and 2014 of the order of 4-8 percentage points for the mean industry. 
Over the period, about 75% of 2-digit industries in each region saw their concentration increase. 
The measured absolute increase is somewhat greater in North America, but this could be a 
result of differences in data coverage between the two regions. The results hold independently 
of whether larger industries are given a greater weight in the calculations, whether the increase 
is calculated in absolute or proportional terms and for both manufacturing and non-financial 
market services. Additionally, the overall increase in concentration does not seem to be driven 
in particular by digital-intensive industries. 
Our results contribute to a broader line of research on how business dynamism in 
developed economies has changed over time. This research suggests that economies appear to 
be less dynamic, with declining entry and exit rates across most OECD economies8 and 
increased divergence between top and bottom productivity firms.9 At the same time, market 
6
 For more information, see http://oe.cd/stan and https://doi.org/10.1787/na-data-en. 
7
 Two-digit industries are the most disaggregate industry level at which we can obtain reliable STAN and SNA data to 
serve as denominator in our concentration measures. 
8
 The trends were initially documented for the US; see, for example, Decker et al. (2014) and Decker et al. (2016). 
For cross-country evidence, see Criscuolo et al. (2014). 
9
 See Andrews et al. (2016) and Berlingieri et al. (2017b). 
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power appears to have increased, as indicated by increasing mark-ups of top firms10 and falling 
labour share of income.11  Whether these findings are the result of a reduction in competition, 
or a sign of competition in action – with market power representing a temporary reward for 
innovative and efficient firms – remains unclear. Our results should, thus, not be interpreted as 
unambiguous evidence of reduced competition, and much less yet of a need for particular policy 
interventions. 
Instead, this paper intends to fill a factual void and present new evidence regarding 
industry concentration trends in North America and particularly Europe. Understanding 
concentration trends in Europe is important on its own but also may shed some light on the 
mechanisms behind the causes of the trends observed elsewhere. If industry concentration has 
been increasing only in some countries, we should search for country-specific factors as drivers 
of these trends. If, on the contrary, it has been concurrently increasing in many OECD countries, 
broader factors, such as technological change or globalisation, are more likely culprits (Van 
Reenen, 2018). That we find a broad increase in concentration across regions and broad 
industries, tentatively points to the latter possibility, but more work and data at different levels 
of aggregation is needed in this area to examine potential nuances across countries. 
This paper sits within a broader stream of ongoing work which examines different 
aspects of the competitive environment, their trends over time, potential drivers of these 
trends and their impacts on various firm and industry outcomes (see Appendix C). 
Given the uncertainty about the drivers of the observed trends, this paper intentionally 
does not encompass potential policy implications. A change in industry concentration can be 
caused by a myriad of factors, some of them related to policies and others not. While some of 
the increase in concentration could be related to anti-competitive regulations or the competition 
policy environment, it could just as well be that technological developments, integration of 
global markets or sustained innovation allow the most efficient firms to increase their 
competitive edge over other firms, contributing to welfare gains and productivity growth. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly reviews the 
existing evidence on concentration trends and the third explains how we measure concentration 
in MultiProd and Orbis data. The fourth section presents concentration trends using MultiProd 
10De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) for the US and Calligaris Criscuolo and Marcolin (2018) for 26 mostly OECD 
economies. 
11
 Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and OECD (2015) document declining labour shares in a large number of 
countries. Autor et al. (2017b) and Barkai (2017) show evidence for the US and discuss some potential drivers of 
the observed trends. De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) show how the rise in markups implies a decrease in labour 
share. 
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firm-level data, and the fifth section presents concentration trends using Orbis business group-
level data. The final section briefly discusses future work that could extend the analysis 
presented in this paper. 
 
 
1. Existing evidence on concentration and competition trends 
 
This paper builds upon a growing number of studies pointing to a weakening of business 
dynamism and competition in the United States over recent years. They have used a range of 
complementary metrics such as business dynamism, profitability, mark-ups and industry 
concentration ratios and a variety of data sources to develop this narrative. 
The recent interest in industry concentration in the United States was triggered by a 
paper by Furman and Orszag (2015), who analyse the sales shares of the 50 largest companies 
within 2-digit sectors using the official firm-level Census Bureau data and find that about three 
quarters of these sectors see an increase in concentration between 1997 and 2007. Autor et al. 
(2017b) similarly rely on the Census Bureau data, but analyse a range of concentration metrics 
(CR4, CR20, Herfindahl)12 within 4-digit SIC industries between 1982 and 2012 and find that 
CR4 increased on average by 4% in services, 5% in manufacturing, 6% in wholesale, 8% in 
utilities, 11% in finance and 15% in retail. Another study examining Census Bureau data was 
undertaken by the Economist Magazine in 2016 (Economist, 2016). Other studies have instead 
used Compustat data, which covers listed firms, again finding an overall increase in industry 
concentration (Grullon et al., 2015; Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2017).  
The evidence on concentration has been complemented by studies looking at other 
proxies of market competition. For example, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) find a strong 
increase in average mark-ups across many US industries, rising from 18% in 1980 to 67% in 
2014, and Hall (2018) obtains similar results. Bessen (2016) in turn documents a rise in 
operating margins, and influential studies by Decker et al. (2014, 2016) offer evidence of 
declining business dynamism and entrepreneurship in the US over recent years. 
The primary contribution of this paper is bringing new evidence on concentration trends 
in Europe, where the literature is so far limited and inconclusive, and, in doing so, also offering 
                                                          
12
 CR4 and CR20 are respectively defined as the share of the largest 4 and the largest 20 firms in the industry total, 
as measured, for example, by sales, employment or production capacity. The Herfindahl Index is defined as the 
sum of squared shares of all firms in an industry. 
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a new perspective on trends documented in other parts of the world, using different measures 
of concentration and different data sources. The paper most closely related to our paper is 
Gutiérrez and Philippon (2018), who use Orbis data and find that concentration ratios have 
remained broadly stable in Europe, both when calculated within countries and when treating 
all of Europe as a single market. Using Euromonitor data for 2010-2015, Valletti et al. (2017) 
find mixed concentration trends for European economies. Analysing 10 consumer product 
markets in the UK,13 the Social Market Foundation (2015) finds varying concentration trends 
across specific markets. 
These findings seem at odds with recent findings on other measures of competition. For 
example, at an aggregate-level, Valletti et al. (2017) find that profits are rising as a share of 
GDP across the EU5 since the mid-1990s, and this growth has been in line with the United 
States. At the firm-level, Calligaris et al. (2018) find strong evidence that mark-ups are 
increasing over the period 2001-2014 using Orbis data for 26 high-income economies, and this 
result holds even when US firms are excluded from the sample. The increase is particularly 
pronounced in the top half of the mark-up distribution and for firms in digital sectors. There is 
also widespread evidence of declining business dynamism across European economies, as 
noted in Calvino et al. (2015). Whilst these metrics reflect different aspects of the competitive 
environment, one would expect a priori for these to move broadly in the same direction, as 
appears to be the case in the United States. 
In our analysis using Orbis data, we construct measures of concentration using business 
group-level data. Some financial data in Orbis is at the business group-level and others at the 
subsidiary-level. Incorrect treatment of these complexities may inadvertently lead to double-
counting, omission or incorrectly allocating activity to industries and countries (we discuss this 
in detail in the next section). To avoid such issues, we draw from Bloom et al. (2013) who 
similarly use the information on business group structure in Orbis to apportion group sales to 
individual subsidiaries, although their aim is to measure product market distance between 
groups. Other Orbis-based studies on which we build are Altomonte et al. (2018), who analyse 
how the institutional environment influences the development of complex group hierarchies, 
and Conconi et al. (2018), who study knowledge diffusion of export market destinations within 
multinational business groups. Our approach of apportioning sales of each group among 
multiple countries and industries is also related to a recent study which compares the effect of 
                                                          
13
 These include, Cars, Electricity, Groceries, Gas, Broadband, Personal current accounts, Mobile telephony, Credit 
cards, Landline-only phone contracts and Mortgages. 
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top firms on concentration at the national level to concentration effects of the top firms’ 
presence in local areas such as counties and Zip codes (Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2018). 
 
 
2. How do we measure concentration? 
 
This section outlines how we measure industry concentration in this study. We first use 
representative MultiProd firm-level data and then move to business-group-level data from 
Orbis-Worldscope-Zephyr. All concentration measures aim to capture the weight of the largest 
firms within an industry, but they can differ in several aspects: firstly, in terms of what is an 
“industry”; secondly, in their definition of “largest”; third, in their choice of denominator 
measuring activity of the whole industry; and finally, in focusing on plants, firms or business 
groups. We consider each of these aspects in turn. 
 
2.1. Industry definition 
 
Economic analyses of concentration trends typically use an industry definition based on the 
industry classification recorded by firms (such as SIC, NAICS, NACE, ISIC etc.; see for 
instance Autor et al., 2017b). Analyses for a single country often focus on a high degree of 
disaggregation, such as 3- or 4-digit industries, since firms within more narrowly defined 
industries are more likely to compete with each other. Cross-country studies, however, are rarer 
and often constrained by data availability to a 2-digit level, as we are in our analysis using Orbis 
and MultiProd.14 
In this paper, we present MultiProd concentration ratios calculated within individual 
countries and Orbis concentration metrics for two world regions – North America and Europe. 
The latter treats each region as a separate market and is motivated by the number of large 
business groups that operate across economies (see Altomonte et al., 2018 amongst others). In 
future work, we are also planning to develop Orbis concentration metrics at the country-level 
for a set of countries which are well-covered in the data. 
                                                          
14
 Orbis data contain industry information at the 4-digit level, but we are limited by the availability of cross-country 
information on aggregate industry output, which is only reported at the level of 2-digit industries. In order to 
maximise country and industry coverage, we aggregate multiple NACE Rev. 2 2-digit industries together in several 
cases. The industry classification which we use in our analysis of Orbis is related to the STAN A64 classification 
and our MultiProd-based analysis is at the level STAN A38 industries. For information on A64 and A38 
classifications, see http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/3max.pdf. 
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The industry definitions we use here differ from the definition of a “market” often used 
by competition authorities, which typically is narrower and relies on expert definitions of 
markets. An interesting but also challenging extension of our work would involve defining 
markets base on contested merger cases, which define the set of relevant competing firms (see 
Haucap and Stiebale, 2016, for an example). However, such data are not comprehensive and 
only define a market for contested mergers at a point in time in a particular context, and as such 
they are not easily generalisable. 
 
2.2. Definition of “Largest” 
 
The literature has used various definitions of “largest” firms in an industry. The most common 
definition relies on an absolute number of the largest firms in terms of sales (e.g. top “CR” 4, 
8 or 20 largest firms). Alternatives include the largest percentage of firms (e.g. top 10% of 
firms) or a Herfindahl index (based on the distribution of firm market shares). MultiProd 
provides the sales of the top 10% of firms (in terms of sales) for each country and 2-digit 
industry.15 For Orbis, we use the measures based on absolute numbers of top firms – CR4, CR8 
and CR20 – as our preferred measures. 
The choice between these metrics is important, as the use of Herfindahl indices or the 
top 10% of firms is not appropriate when the coverage of firms varies across industries or over 
time, as is the case with Orbis. Since MultiProd is representative data of the population of firms, 
the set of top 10% of firms is measured consistently over time. In Orbis, however, the sample 
size typically improves in later years, with smaller firms often added over time (see Bajgar et 
al., forthcoming). As the coverage expands, more and smaller firms will cross the threshold of 
the top 10%, with the effect of reducing the measured concentration. Similarly, since a 
Herfindahl index relies on the distribution of market shares in an industry, changes in the 
coverage of firms will again lead to artificial changes in the resulting concentration index. 
These problems remain even when re-weighting Orbis using employment, since Orbis 
disproportionately covers prominent and successful firms even within size classes (see Bajgar 
et al., forthcoming). Our definition of concentration based on absolute numbers of firms (CR4, 
CR8 and CR20) mitigates many of these problems in Orbis, since the data typically contain the 
largest firms in each industry throughout the period, and the small number of groups included 
                                                          
15
 Other concentration metrics are not available in the current version of the MultiProd data but will be collected 
in the future. 
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in our measures allows us to manually check that important firms do not suddenly appear or 
disappear during the sample period as a result of coverage changes.  
It is also important to decide on the variable in terms of which the weight of each firm 
is measured. Most studies measure industry concentration in terms of sales, but other 
dimensions, such as employment, value added, capacity, innovation or valuation could also be 
considered. In this paper, we also primarily focus on sales, and in our analysis of MultiProd 
data we additionally report concentration of employment.  
2.3. Industry Denominator 
To construct market shares of the largest firms in each industry, their sales need to be scaled 
by the total sales in each industry. In principle, this information can either be calculated by 
summing sales across all firms in the microdata at hand, or it can come from an industry-level 
database such as OECD STAN. For the MultiProd country-level analysis, we take the former 
approach, using the total firm sales for each country as calculated from microdata in the 
MultiProd project. We take the latter approach for the Orbis regional-level analysis, where we 
obtain a regional measure of sales by aggregating OECD STAN data across countries within 
the region. 
The choice of industry denominator is non-trivial – using the total sales of firms in the 
data is not appropriate when the coverage of firms varies across industries or over time, as is 
the case with Orbis. Since MultiProd is representative data at the country-level, total firm sales 
for that country closely track STAN aggregates (Bajgar et al, 2017). However, for Orbis this is 
not the case. As noted above, larger firms are often well-covered in Orbis from earlier years, 
but the sample size typically improves in later years with smaller firms often added over time. 
Therefore, the industry denominator will tend to increase with coverage in Orbis and lead to 
artificial changes in the resulting concentration index. However, the addition of larger firms in 
earlier years (in the raw data) and smaller firms in later years, can make the industry 
denominator grow differentially over time, which is further complicated if large and small firms 
have differing sales growth rates. Our definition of denominator mitigates many of these 
problems, since OECD STAN is comparable across industries and countries over time. 
10 
Using MultiProd 
Our analysis using MultiProd data constructs two concentration measures. The first measure is 
the market share accounted for by the top decile of firms (ranked according to their sales). The 
higher the market share, the bigger the weight that these firms have in the economy, and the 
more concentrated is the economic activity. The indicator is computed as 𝜗𝑗10 ≡ ∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑆𝑗𝑖∈𝑆𝑗10̅̅̅̅ ,
where 𝑆𝑖𝑗 designates the sales of firm i operating in industry j, 𝑆𝑗 the total sales in industry j 
and 𝑆𝑗10̅̅̅̅  the top decile in the 2-digit sector j of firms ranked by sales.
The second indicator examines the share of employment that the same firms (i.e. firms 
with highest sales) represent to understand their influence on labour markets: 𝐿𝑗10 ≡ ∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝐿𝑗 ,𝑖∈𝑆𝑗10̅̅̅̅  
where L corresponds to employment. Therefore, concentration is measured by the share of gross 
output and/or employment in the top decile of the sales distribution, and it is measured at the 
2-digit level. 
Using Orbis 
In the analysis based on Orbis data, we measure concentration as the share of industry sales due 
to the four largest companies (or groups) in the industry. Formally, we define it as 𝐶𝑅4 ≡ ∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑂𝑅𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁4𝑖=1 ,𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑂𝑅𝐵𝐼𝑆 comes from Orbis data and designates the sales of firm i which is among the top 4 firms 
in industry j. 𝑆𝑗𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁 marks the total output of industry j as reported in the OECD STAN
database, which is derived from national accounts.16 
16
 Due to data limitations, we use Orbis sales in the numerator but STAN output in the denominator. For most 
industries, sales and output are very similar, although a more pronounced difference might exist in certain 
industries, such as Wholesale and Retail.  
2.4. Concentration Metric 
11 
Existing approaches in the literature and MultiProd 
The final choice is whether one considers sales of enterprises or business groups. Many large 
firms may not be independent, but rather part of the same business group (Altomonte et al., 
2018). Neglecting these firm ownership linkages may lead to an understatement of 
concentration. In addition, the activities of the large business groups can often spread across 
several industries and countries, and therefore, focusing on individual subsidiaries may miss 
these linkages across markets and industries. Therefore, measuring concentration at the level 
of firms and business groups can reflect distinct aspects of the underlying economic trends. 
Firm-level analysis often does not contain detailed information on business group 
ownership, as in the case of MultiProd. Statistical offices can collect information on domestic 
firm owners, including domestic business groups, but the identity of foreign multinational 
owners is often unknown, especially to external researchers. In addition, information on those 
subsidiaries of locally present foreign groups which are located in other countries is never 
recorded. It is then impossible to measure domestic subsidiaries of the same foreign 
multinational (for a notable exception, see Conconi et al., 2018). Without detailed information 
on domestic and foreign firm-to-firm ownership linkages, it is not possible to construct 
measures at the business group level. For these reasons, MultiProd reports concentration at the 
level of individual firms. 
Orbis contains comprehensive, enormous firm-to-firm data on ownership linkages, for 
both domestic and foreign ownership, which allows us to construct measures of business 
groups. The ownership data has been used extensively in the academic literature on foreign 
ownership and international shock transmission (e.g. Cravino and Levchenko, 2017).  
Unfortunately, the data primarily start in 2007. We therefore supplement the Orbis 
ownership data with the Zephyr M&A database to capture earlier changes in ownership and 
construct a series starting as early as 2000 for many firms. We then undertake extensive 
ownership checks and cleaning, including manually inspecting the subsidiaries listed in 
financial statements for the very largest 300 groups. These steps are detailed in the Appendix. 
How a researcher treats business groups in Orbis can have substantial impacts on the 
resulting concentration measures (see Figure 1). 
The literature has taken several approaches here, each of which has particular 
limitations: 
 A first approach is to neglect business groups and focus only on individual firms
(“unconsolidated” information in Orbis). This will underestimate concentration if multiple
2.5. Firm-level or business group-level analysis 
12 
firms in the same market are part of the same group and exacerbates coverage issues. For 
instance, most US firms in the database have only business group information.  
Example: If a large firm acquires one of its main competitors and one only considers individual 
firm-level information and ignores group-level information, measured concentration will 
counterintuitively remain unchanged. 
 A second approach is to neglect subsidiaries and focus only on the headquarters of business
groups (“consolidated” information in Orbis). Accordingly, this attributes the entire activity of
the business group to the country of the headquarters and industry of the primary activity. This
will overestimate concentration in the headquarter industry and country and underestimate
concentration in subsidiaries’ industries and countries, if the group activity is spread across
several industries and countries.
Example: In 2015, Telefónica business group recorded global revenues of 47 billion Euros.17
Yet in the same year, the total output of the “Telecommunications” (ISIC 61) sector in Spain
was about 31 billion (OECD STAN). Allocating all of Telefónica business group’s revenues to
the headquarters would mean measured CR1 concentration in Spanish telecommunications is
150%.  
Example: Telefónica is also a major telecommunications player in Germany and Brazil, and 
the largest subscription television provider in Spain. Neglecting Telefónica’s subsidiaries will 
underestimate the concentration in these subsidiary markets.  
 A third approach is to include both the activity of the business group and other firm subsidiaries.
In this approach, researchers drop the firm-level information (“unconsolidated”) for
headquarter firms – to exclude the most obvious source of double counting – but still include
their subsidiaries.18 This will overestimate concentration since it will double-count subsidiary
revenues.
Example: This approach will count the revenues of each Telefónica’s subsidiary twice: when
calculating concentration in Spanish telecommunications and again when calculating it in the
country and the industry where the subsidiary is located.
The problem with the approaches introduced above can be seen as undertaking too little 
(approach 1) or too much (approaches 2 & 3) consolidation. Our approach aims to reduce the 
biases arising from these approaches by combining information from both types of accounts. 
17https://www.telefonica.com/documents/153952/13347920/informe_integrado_2015_en.pdf/6aee51fd-ed01-
430c-a7dd-e8342922f97d 
18
 This is often the case because of complexities in using the Orbis ownership data to identify the subsidiaries of 
parent business groups. 
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Our business-group apportioning approach using Orbis 
Our approach leverages the detailed Orbis-Zephyr ownership database to construct measures 
of business groups and apportion activity across the countries and industries in which the group 
operates. This apportioning approach combines the advantages of the three procedures noted 
above. We specifically draw inspiration from Bloom et al. (2013) who use a similar approach 
to apportion business group sales to individual subsidiary industries and countries to measure 
the product market distance between business groups.  
Our approach uses the business group structure to measure the group sales within each 
industry and country. In particular, we aggregate the sales of subsidiaries of a business group 
within the same market (e.g. 2-digit industry and a country), as noted in Figure 2. In contrast 
to Approach 1 above, this means that if a business group acquires one of its main competitors 
in the same market, the business group’s market share would increase and hence our measured 
concentration would increase. 
Our apportioning approach prevents allocation of the entire business group sales to the 
headquarters, even in cases where the parent only reports business group-level information. To 
continue the example of a Spanish telecoms business group, see Figure 3. Suppose the business 
group has total revenues of €100 million, of which €20 million is accounted for by a German 
telecoms subsidiary, €30 million reflects sales of a Spanish broadcasting subsidiary and €10 
million of a Spanish telecoms subsidiary. In this case, importantly the parent is missing firm-
level (“unconsolidated”) information available. An approach not using information on the 
group structure would either allocate the total of €100 million to the Spanish telecoms parent, 
or double-count both €100 million of the parent and €60 million of the subsidiaries (recall 
Approach 2 and 3 respectively in the prior section). In contrast, the “apportioning approach” 
allocates the subsidiary sales to the subsidiary industries and only the rest (€40 million in this 
case) to the parent. Here, we remove the double counting issue and also apportion the group 
activity across all the market where the firm operates - telecoms and broadcasting industries in 
Germany and Spain.19  
19
 Note in the cases where we have firm-level information for all subsidiaries including the parent, the aggregate 
sales may not always sum to the business group total. This is to be expected given intra-group transactions are 
removed from group-level (“consolidated”) financial information. To ensure that changes in intra-group 
transaction over time do not drive the measured trends, whenever the total sales of all subsidiaries and the parent 
exceed the business group-level total, we scale them down to match that total. We examine the robustness of this 
decision later in the paper. 
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Our approach is computationally and data intensive. Firstly, it requires comprehensive 
ownership information to determine which firms are part of the same business group. To this 
end, an extensive cleaning of the ownership module in Orbis has been undertaken based on 
complementary information in the Zephyr mergers & acquisitions database and manual checks 
of large firms. The corrected ownership data has been constructed for 2.8 million firms each 
year, further details are available in the Appendix. Secondly, it requires consistent financial 
information at the business-group and firm-level, across a broad set of firms, countries and 
industries. We combine Orbis and Worldscope data for 100 countries across all business sector 
industries from 2000 to 2014, and supplement this with manual checks for some of the largest 
business groups. One caveat is our data currently has poorer coverage of subsidiary-level 
information (but good business group-level information) for US firms – which is something we 
wish to improve in future work. Again, details of the financial data construction are detailed in 
the Appendix. 
3. Firm-level concentration measures with MultiProd data
In this section, we present analysis for European economies based on the MultiProd project, 
which calculates statistics from nationally representative microdata. Accordingly, the 
concentration metrics in this section are measured at the firm-level, contrasting with business-
group level metrics in the next section. See more details about the project in the Appendix and 
in Berlingieri et al. (2017a). 
3.1. Sample 
We use countries for which data are fully representative of the population of firms. Countries 
included and period covered are as follows: Austria (2008-2012), Belgium (2003-2011), 
Germany (2003-2012), Denmark (2001-2012), Finland (2001-2012), France (2001-2012), 
Hungary (2001-2012), Norway (2001-2012), Portugal (2004-2012), Sweden (2002-2012). 
The MultiProd database generally covers most sectors of the economy, but this study 
focuses on manufacturing and non-financial market services to enhance cross-country 
comparability. Manufacture of Coke and Refined Petroleum, and Real Estate are excluded from 
the analysis (also for consistency with later Orbis analyses). Macro-sectors are defined 
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according to the STAN A7 classification and detailed industries follow the STAN A38 
classification. 
3.2. Results 
Both manufacturing and services look equally concentrated in terms of the share of gross 
output, value added and total employment accounted for by firms with the largest sales (see 
Figure 4). In particular, we plot the mean gross output (GO), value added (VA) and employment 
(L), for the bottom 10%, the top 10% and the 10th to 90th percentile of the sales distribution 
(averaged over all the available European countries and years). The figure shows that about 
83% (82%) of the gross output in manufacturing (services) is produced by the firms in the top 
decile of sales. The rest of the distribution accounts for less than 20% of the gross output, with 
the bottom decile producing a negligible share. Very similar results are obtained when looking 
at valued added: about 79% (77%) of the value added in manufacturing (services) is produced 
by the firms in the top decile of sales, with the rest of the distribution accounting for slightly 
more than 20% of the value added. Employment is slightly less concentrated: the firms in the 
top decile of sales employ 67% (66%) of total employment in manufacturing (services). Both 
manufacturing and services look equally concentrated. 
We next explore if concentration has increased over time within each country-2 digit 
(STAN A38) sector. We adopt an econometric approach that allows presenting trends within 
countries and disaggregated industries20. These trends, computed separately for manufacturing 
and services, accurately capture the evolution of concentration within each 2-digit sector in 
each country. The first year is taken as a baseline and normalised to zero, so that the coefficients 
are interpreted as the average change within country-sector of Gross Output or Employment, 
relative to the first year. In other words, these reflect cumulative changes since the first year. 
We present results that account for the industry composition of the economy, to reflect 
representative trends for manufacturing and market services in each country. We present results 
of both unweighted and weighted regressions, with weights corresponding to the share of Gross 
20
 This econometric estimation of trends relies on the estimation of year dummies, controlling for country-industry 
fixed effects. More formally, to analyse the evolution over time of a variable, say concentration C, we estimate the 
following regression: 𝐶𝑐𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝑧𝑐𝑗 + 𝜀𝑐𝑗𝑡,
where 𝑧𝑐𝑗  correspond to country c-industry j fixed effects. Thus, the coefficients 𝛽𝑡  associated with the year
dummies 𝑦𝑡 capture the average concentration in a given year already cleaned from country-sector specificities.
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Output of the industry in the total Gross Output of manufacturing or market services (as 
applicable). 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show that concentration seems to have increased in the European 
countries considered over the period 2001-2012. In particular, in manufacturing, the share of 
gross output in the top decile of the sales is around 2 percentage points higher in 2012 than in 
2001 (see Figure 5). This is true irrespective of whether or not the results are weighted by the 
total sales of each industry. The increase in non-financial market services is of similar 
magnitude when all industries are given an equal weight; it is closer to 3 percentage points 
when a greater weight is assigned to industries with greater aggregate sales, indicating that 
some large industries are among those which saw a higher increase in concentration. Looking 
at concentration in terms of employment, we find that in services it has increased by about 1.5 
percentage points (over 2 percentage points when weighting for industry size), but, after an 
initial increase between 2001 and 2004, it has remained essentially constant in manufacturing 
and even appear slightly declining when we apply weighting (see Figure 6). The two take-away 
messages therefore are that (1) sales concentration has increased more than employment 
concentration, and (2) concentration has increased more in non-financial market services than 
in manufacturing. 
These results are consistent with what was found using alternative measures of 
concentration in Andrews et al., (2016) using the commercial database Orbis for 24 countries 
and Autor et al. (2017a,b) for the US. They find a negative correlation between the labour share 
and concentration, if the latter is expressed in terms of sales. If, instead, concentration is 
calculated in terms of employment the correlation becomes positive. This result might be 
explained by the fact that canonical superstar (service) firms such as Google or Facebook 
employ relatively few workers compared to their revenues. In other words, superstar firms grow 
“without mass”, that is, mostly in terms of revenues rather than employment. An additional 
result confirming that firms are experiencing “scale without mass” is found in Berlingieri et al. 
(2018a,b), where we find a rather flat link between wages and size expressed in terms of 
employment, but a tight and positive link of wages with both productivity and size expressed 
in terms of sales. 
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4. Business group-level concentration measures with Orbis data
The MultiProd measures described in the previous section reflect concentration within each 
country and industry. The underlying MultiProd microdata consist of observations at the level 
of individual firms, but these firms may not be independent and may be part of the same 
business group. Neglecting these firm ownership linkages may lead to an understatement of 
concentration. In this section, we complement the previous analysis by using Orbis data, which 
allows us to measure concentration at the business-group level – explicitly taking into account 
these firm ownership linkages. 
4.1. Orbis-Worldscope-Zephyr data 
The financial data in this section primarily come from Orbis database complemented with 
Worldscope data on listed firms. We undertake a number of cleaning steps on the financial data 
in Orbis and Worldscope and, to improve coverage for listed firms particularly in North 
America, we combine the two data sources using firm identifiers.21 Identifying business groups 
requires comprehensive firm ownership data. Accordingly, we have supplemented Orbis data 
on business group owners (global ultimate owners) and immediate ownership linkages with 
Zephyr data on Mergers and Acquisitions and a series of manual and automated checks. In both 
financial and ownership data, the checks included extensive cleaning steps, through a series of 
automatic and manual checks of the largest business groups in each industry and world region 
against their financial statements. See Annex A for more information. 
We use the combined data to measure concentration at the level of 2-digit NACE rev.2 
industries and of world regions.22 For reasons of data coverage and comparability, we focus on 
manufacturing and non-financial market services (excluding Manufacture of coke and refined 
petroleum products, Real estate activities and Activities of head offices; management 
consultancy activities, with the former two also excluded from earlier MultiProd analysis).23  
21
 We use the International Securities Identification Number to match firms in Orbis and Worldscope. 
22
 We plan to present results at an economy-level in a future work. 
23
 We also exclude sectors where, in some years, we observe fewer than 20 business groups in one of the regions. 
This is the case for 5 sectors in North America: Repair of machinery & equipment; Water transport; Warehousing; 
Postal and courier activities; and Travel agency. For better comparability, we drop these sectors for both world 
regions. 
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We include the years 2000-2014 for 21 economies. The metrics for Europe are based 
on Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK, and 
those for North America reflect the US and Canada. 
Despite the effort so far, further data cleaning is still under way, so the results below 
come with some caveats. One particular caveat is that our data currently have poorer coverage 
of subsidiary-level information for North American firms, although this is not the case for North 
American business-group-level information (Orbis and Worldscope together cover close to the 
universe of listed firms). This means that all domestic activity of these business groups may be 
allocated to the industry of the parent firm, rather than spread across domestic subsidiaries. In 
North America, this likely leads to higher measured concentration in levels and may also lead 
to more pronounced absolute changes in concentration. This limitation is something we wish 
to address in the future. 
4.2. Results 
We examine if concentration has increased over time within each region-2 digit sector. We 
adopt an econometric approach that allows presenting trends within regions and disaggregated 
industries. This is similar to that noted earlier for MultiProd analysis, but defined at the level 
of a region, rather than a particular economy. Unless otherwise noted, we show below 
cumulative average absolute changes in industry concentration levels, with the average 
calculated across industries in each region and year. These are normalised to zero in the first 
period. For some analyses, however, we show cumulative average proportional changes in 
industry concentration, which are again normalised to zero in the first year. Compared to the 
former approach, the latter approach effectively assigns more weight to concentration trends in 
industries that start at low levels of concentration initially. 
Overall concentration trends in Europe and North America 
We find a noticeable increase in industry concentration for both Europe and North America 
over the period (see Figure 7). Over the period 2000-2014, 77% of 2-digit industries in Europe 
and 74% in North America saw their concentration increase. Over the period, concentration 
levels increased by 4 percentage points in the average European industry, compared to around 
8 percentage points in the average North American industry. This means that the top 8 firms 
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account for 4% (8%) more industry sales in 2014 than 2000 in Europe (North America). At first 
glance, this may suggest there is a stronger increase in North America. However, these 
increases are somewhat stronger than Autor et al. (2017b), who find an increase of around 4% 
for the top 4 or 20 firms since 2000 (admittedly using firm-level rather than business group-
level concentration), which suggests that this could very well be due to the data limitations for 
North America noted above.24 In particular, North American firms have poor coverage of 
subsidiary financial information, which reduces our ability to apportion business group activity 
when they have large (missing) domestic subsidiaries.25 
We find a similar picture when we weight the results by total industry sales as reported 
in STAN data, effectively focusing more on concentration trends in larger industries (again see 
Figure 7). For Europe, weighting strengthens the growth in concentration by about 0.5 
percentage points, implying that larger industries are showing somewhat faster increases in 
concentration. For North America, we find the opposite – a slightly lower increase in the 
weighted mean concentration. 
Our findings are remarkably robust across concentration metrics with varying definition 
of “top” firms (see Note: The countries for Europe include BE, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, 
GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, NL, NO, PL, PT, SI and SE, and the countries for North America include 
CA and US. Included industries cover 2-digit manufacturing and non-financial market services. 
Concentration metrics reflect the share of the top 8 firms in each industry (CR8). The graphs 
can be interpreted as the cumulated absolute changes in levels of sales concentration for the 
mean 2-digit sector within each region. For instance, in 2014 the mean (unweighted) European 
industry had 4 percentage point higher sales concentration than in 2000. Weighted figures 
reflect industry concentration weighted by the industry’s share in region total sales, such that 
larger industries are weighted more heavily (Figure 8)). 
We show concentration metrics calculated using the sales of the top 4, top 8 and top 20 
firms in each 2-digit region-industry (CR4, CR8 and CR20 respectively). Clearly, the market 
share of the top 20 firms will always be larger than the top 4. Therefore, to ensure comparability 
across the different metrics, we show proportional changes in concentration, relative to the 
initial year, rather than the absolute changes. For Europe, the proportional concentration 
increase when 4 or 20 largest firms are considered is about 20%, slightly more than the 16% 
24
 This difference is not driven by the fact that we analyse North America as a single market while Autor et al. 
(2017b) focus only on the United States. Excluding Canadian firms does not significantly alter the results. 
25
 We generally have better coverage for foreign subsidiaries of North American business groups. 
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proportional increase in the CR8 metric that we use as a baseline. For North America, all 
measures indicate a similar increase in industry concentration of around 28%. The results paint 
a similar picture as Autor et al. (2017b), who find similar changes in the CR4 and CR20 
measures for many US industries. 
Sectoral concentration trends in Europe and North America 
We find a similarly strong increase in concentration in manufacturing and services in Europe 
and a stronger increase in services in North America (see Figure 9). In Europe, both in the 
average manufacturing industry and the average services industry the top 8 firms account for 
about 4% more industry sales in 2014 than the top 8 in 2000. These estimates compare 
reasonably closely with MultiProd firm-level (sales) concentration measures in the earlier 
sections, which showed an increase of around 3% for services and 2% for manufacturing. In 
North America, the increase in concentration is more similar to Europe for manufacturing (6 
percentage points), with the higher overall increase in concentration being mainly due to 
services industries, where the share of sales by the top 8 firms increased by 10 percentage 
points.  
The increase in concentration does not seem to be driven by digital-intensive sectors in 
particular (Figure 10). We define digital sectors as the top quartile of digital intensity as 
measured by Calvino et al., 2017). In Europe, we see similar trends for both digital-intensive 
and less-digital sectors. In North America, the increase in concentration seems to actually be 
somewhat stronger in the less-digital sectors. For digital intensive industries we find initially 
flat concentration in the early 2000s, which could be seen as a period when many new internet-
based start-up technologies started to become mainstream. This also mirrors findings for the 
US where there is a noticeable growth in high-tech business dynamism in the early late 1990s 
and early 2000s (Decker et al., 2016). From the mid-2000s onwards, we find an upward trend 
in concentration also for digital industries. 
Impact of key concentration measurement choices 
This final section briefly shows how different methodological and data cleaning choices 
influence the measured concentration trends. This section follows closely from the earlier 
methodological discussion in Section 3. 
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Industry concentration is essentially a ratio. We first focus on key decisions relating to 
the denominator, before considering the numerator below.  
The choice of denominator has a striking effect on measured industry concentration 
trends (Figure 11). Our baseline analysis uses STAN measures of total industry sales for reasons 
of consistency and completeness. Alternative approaches in the literature have been to use the 
total sales of all firms in raw Orbis data or the top 100 firms in an industry in the raw Orbis 
data. Both are vulnerable to well-known Orbis coverage issues, as noted earlier. We compare 
the concentration trends obtained using the different denominators, looking at proportional 
changes in concentration, as in the case of comparing CR4, CR8 and CR20 metrics above. We 
find that scaling our baseline numerator with either denominator from Orbis completely 
reverses measured industry concentration trends. Concentration is found to fall over time. Our 
definition of denominator mitigates many of these problems, since OECD STAN is comparable 
across industries and countries over time.26 
We now turn to methodological choices regarding the numerator, which reflects the 
sales of the top 8 entities in each industry.  
The choice between firm-level, group-level and apportioned analysis can lead to 
significantly different results (Figure 12). The entities (among which the top 8 actors in each 
industry are identified) can be defined as firms, business groups or apportioned business group 
segments (baseline). For North American industry concentration, the choice of entity level at 
which the analysis is undertaken makes a large difference.27 Using only subsidiary-level data 
(labelled “unconsolidated only”) gives a nearly flat trend, because the coverage of subsidiary-
level information for US firms is poor in Orbis. Including both business group and firm 
subsidiary data (“consolidated preferred”) should not lead to substantial double-counting in the 
case of North America (again due to the poor coverage at the subsidiary level), but it incorrectly 
allocates the entire group activity to the single industry and country of the headquarters. 
26
 Another potential concern, mainly in the manufacturing sector, could be that the concentration as measured here 
does not take consider the fact that exporters based in other regions also sell in Europe and North America, and 
European and North American firms sell some of their output in other regions. Unfortunately, properly accounting 
for this would require group-level information on imports to as well as exports from Europe and North America, 
neither of which is available to us. Note also that whether an adjustment for imports and exports is desirable 
ultimately depends on the reasons for which industry concentration is analysed in any given case. Taking into 
account imports and exports is more important when treating industry concentration as a proxy for the intensity of 
competition. In contrast, using industry output alone is more appropriate when considering the implications of 
concentration related to, for instance, inequality, monopsony or some firms being “too big to fail”. 
27
 For North America, we only illustrate the difference across methodologies from 2006 onwards. These 
differences would be much more pronounced if the earlier years were included, as a sharp increase in Orbis 
coverage for the United States in 2006 leads to an increase in concentration when Orbis is not complemented with 
information from Worldscope. 
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Consequently, the resulting concentration measure increases more than the baseline. For 
Europe, all three approaches lead to a similar overall increase in industry concentration over 
the sample period, but their trajectory is different, with the increase being concentrated in the 
early 2000s when we use subsidiary-level information and in the second half of the sample 
period when we combine business group and firm subsidiary data. 
Another choice surrounds the treatment of cases where the sales for subsidiaries do not 
sum to the total of the parent (as mentioned in the methodology section). To some extent this 
is expected, since intra-group sales are a feature of multinationals in general, with one part of 
the firm purchasing inputs from another part. These intra-company transactions are removed 
from the group accounts but show up in each subsidiary’s sales. To take account of these cases, 
in our baseline specification we scale down the sales of all subsidiaries when subsidiary sales 
sum to more than the group. Additionally, it would also be possible to scale up subsidiary sales 
where they sum to less than the group, which might reflect missing subsidiary data. For North 
America, the scaling has very little effect (Figure 13). This is again due to the very limited 
availability of unconsolidated information for US firms in Orbis. For Europe, all three 
approaches to scaling show an increase in concentration over the analysed period, but with 
some differences in its magnitude. When we do not scale down the output of business groups 
with a large intensity of intra-group sales, the average concentration is slightly more volatile 
but the overall increase over the sample period is very similar as with the baseline approach. 
When we also scale up subsidiary sales whenever they add up to less than the group sales, the 
concentration remains flat during early 2000s but shows a similar trend as with the baseline 
approach from 2005 onwards. Such scaling up implicitly assumes that the missing data is 
distributed in the same industries and regions as the sample of subsidiary sales we observe. In 
contrast, not scaling up implicitly assumes that the missing subsidiary data is located in regions 
and industries outside the sample. Given that our sample consists of countries with relatively 
good and consistent coverage in Orbis, we think that the latter assumption will more often hold 
in our data and consequently opt for not scaling up as our baseline approach. 
Finally, the data cleaning undertaken has a large effect on results for both regions 
(Figure 14). We undertake extensive cleaning of the Orbis financial and ownership data, 
consisting of a large set of automatic and manual corrections based on additional data and 
internal consistency checks. In the case of Europe, comparing results using the cleaned and 
uncleaned data highlights the high demands of the apportioning approach on data quality. 
Uncorrected data show large fluctuations in concentration, with little overall trend. Cleaning 
the financial information for the largest firms and complementing it from other sources (e.g. 
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Worldscope, annual reports) leads to less volatility and some upward trend. However, the 
overall increase in concentration more than doubles when we also correct the ownership 
information based on Zephyr and manual checks of the largest business groups in our data. For 
North America, the essential cleaning step involved complementing Orbis financials with 
Worldscope. In its absence, the data show a spurious increase in industry concentration in 2006, 
due to a significant increase in Orbis coverage for North America. 
6. Next Steps
The research outlined in this paper is still in its first phase. The purpose of the paper is twofold: 
to present evidence filling a gap in the current knowledge and to gain feedback on the 
methodology employed.  
This paper presents evidence on an increase in industry concentration in both Europe 
and in North America over the period 2000-2014. The increase is observed in representative 
firm-level data from OECD MultiProd as well as in business group-level matched and 
extensively cleaned Orbis-Worldscope data. It holds for both manufacturing and non-financial 
market services. For digital sectors, we find initially flat concentration in the early 2000s and a 
similar growth rate as less-digital sectors thereafter. 
There are several avenues open for future work building on these findings. 
The most immediate extension of the work presented here is related to the concentration 
measures computed with the Orbis-Worldscope data. We are going to compute country-level 
concentration measures, in addition to the regional ones presented here. Additionally, we also 
plan to incorporate industry imports into our concentration measures to ensure that they only 
reflect changes in domestic market size. Along similar lines, we could extend our apportioning 
approach to take into account exports. Furthermore, we could examine possible differential 
trends across 2-digit industries and possibly include some of the sectors not presented in this 
paper, such as financial services or utilities (currently dropped for data quality issues). Going 
beyond concentration measures, we could explore the churning among the top firms in each 
industry, and the extent to which the growth of the top firms is driven by changes in group 
structure or organic growth. 
24 
We also plan to examine more details of the mechanisms involved, which has links to 
work conducted under the Going Digital - Horizontal Project and work chosen by the Global 
Forum on Productivity, in particular work examining possible links between concentration 
trends, mergers and acquisition activity and the implications for productivity growth. Another 
related angle is to examine concentration in patenting activity, which might provide evidence 
for whether these technologies are diffusing widely throughout the economy or remain held by 
a few firms. Finally, we can econometrically analyse the relationship between the concentration 
trends and proxy variables for potential drivers of these trends, such as globalisation, 
technological changes and product-market regulations. 
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Table A1 
Comparability of Orbis and Worldscope Data 
Firm-level ratio of sales in Worldscope to sales in Orbis for a given year 
1st 
Percentile 
5th Percentile 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
95th 
Percentile 
99th 
Percentile 
Sales 0.18 0.66 0.93 1.00 1.05 1.29 5.19 
Sales 
Growth (1 
Year) 
0.22 0.69 0.91 1.01 1.10 1.50 5.25 
Note: Comparison of sales (in current price Euros) for firm-year observations in both Worldscope and Orbis data. Ratios reflect 
Worldscope sales (growth) as a proportion of Orbis sales (growth). 
Source: Thomson Reuters Worldscope and Bureau Van Dijk Orbis databases.  
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Table A2 
Increased Coverage by Including Worldscope Data 
No. Additional Observations 
North America Europe Other 
2000 11,770 5,639 6,928 
2002 11,206 4,667 4,712 
2004 11,051 4,941 5,032 
2006 9,859 6,591 5,716 
2008 8,969 6,223 6,464 
2010 8,800 5,208 5,675 
2012 8,284 4,858 5,862 
2014 3,312 4,424 4,960 
Note: Comparison of the number of additional firm observations from supplementing Orbis with Worldscope data. North 
America and Europe defined consistent with earlier concentration results. Every second year is shown for parsimony. 
Source: Thomson Reuters Worldscope and Bureau Van Dijk Orbis databases.  
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Table A3 
Number of Firms with Temporary Changes in Ultimate Owner 
Firms with Uncorrected Global 
Ultimate Owner 
Firms with Corrected Global 
Ultimate Owner 
2000 0 1,572,602 
2001 0 1,662,406 
2002 0 1,756,356 
2003 0 1,852,251 
2004 0 1,961,766 
2005 0 2,062,816 
2006 0 2,157,180 
2007 853,442 2,232,027 
2008 945,696 2,309,021 
2009 1,075,344 2,382,528 
2010 1,122,678 2,429,363 
2011 1,288,558 2,459,739 
2012 1,465,139 2,472,003 
2013 1,532,972 2,463,395 
2014 1,544,480 2,424,373 
2015 1,722,394 2,375,192 
2016 1,808,716 2,321,353 
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Figure 1 
Approaches to selecting between Business Group and Individual Firm information in 
Orbis 
Notes: The figure depicts an example of a hypothetical group consisting of a parent company operating in the telecom sector 
in Spain, with a Spanish and German subsidiary in the same sector and a Spanish subsidiary operating in broadcasting. 
Information is available at the business group level (“consolidated) (CABCD) alongside information for each individual firm 
(“unconsolidated”), including the parent company (UA) and the subsidiaries (UB, UC, UD). Approach 1 uses only individual firm 
level information (“unconsolidated”). Approach 2 uses only business group level information (“consolidated”). Approach 3 
uses business group level information when available and individual firm level information otherwise. 
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Figure 2 
Aggregating within but not across markets 
Notes: The figure depicts an example of a hypothetical business group consisting of a parent company operating in the telecom 
sector in Spain, a Spanish and German subsidiary in the same sector and a Spanish subsidiary operating in broadcasting. 
Information is available at the business group level (“consolidated) (CABCD) alongside information for each individual firm 
(“unconsolidated”), including the parent company (UA) and the subsidiaries (UB, UC, UD). Our “apportioning” approach 
aggregates revenues across firms operating in the same market but not across firms operating in different markets – so 
aggregates telecom revenues in Spain, but not other countries or industries. 
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Figure 3 
Apportioning when Parent Company Firm-Level Information is Not Available 
Notes: The figure depicts an example of a hypothetical business group with a Spanish and German subsidiary in the same 
sector and a Spanish subsidiary operating in broadcasting. Information is available at the business group level (“consolidated) 
(CABCD) alongside information for each individual subsidiary information (“unconsolidated”) (UB, UC, UD). In contrast to earlier 
examples, we are missing parent firm-level (“unconsolidated”) information. Our “apportioning” approach aggregates revenues 
across firms operating in the same market but not across firms operating in different markets and attributes the balance to the 
parent firm. In this case, the business group has sales of €100m, with total subsidiary sales of €60m (=€10m+€30m+€20m), so 
we estimate parent firm sales in Spanish Telecom to be €40m (=€100m – €60m). 
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Figure 4 
Gross output, value added and employment shares in European countries by quantiles 
of sales 
Notes: Countries included are AUT, BEL, DEU, DNK, FIN, FRA, HUN, NOR, PRT, SWE. The period considered is 2001-
2012. Averages across all countries and years. 
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Figure 5 
Share of gross output accounted for by largest firms in select European countries 
Top-10% firms in terms of sales, year effects from weighted regression 
Note: Countries included are AUT, BEL, DEU, DNK, FIN, FRA, HUN, NOR, PRT, SWE. Year effects from regressions 
including country-industry and year dummies. The graphs can be interpreted as the cumulated growth rates of concentration 
in gross output within each country and 2-digit sector over the period. For instance, in 2012 non-financial market services the 
share of gross output accounted by the top decile of the sales is roughly 3 percentage points higher than in 2001. The estimates 
reported in the graph are those of year dummies in a cross-country regression of share of gross output in the top decile of the 
sales distribution. 
Source: MultiProd 2017. 
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Figure 6 
Share of employment accounted for by largest firms in select European countries 
Top-10% firms in terms of sales, year effects from weighted regression 
Note: countries included are AUT, BEL, DEU, DNK, FIN, FRA, HUN, NOR, PRT, SWE. Year effects from regressions 
including country-industry and year dummies. The graphs can be interpreted as the cumulated growth rates of concentration 
in employment within each country and 2-digit sector over the period. For instance, in 2012 non-financial market services the 
share of employment accounted by the top decile of the sales is roughly 2 percentage points higher than in 2001. The estimates 
reported in the graph are those of year dummies in a cross-country regression of share of employment in the top decile of the 
sales distribution.  
Source: MultiProd 2017. 
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Figure 7 
Weighted & Unweighted Industry Concentration (CR8) in Europe & North America 
Note: The countries for Europe include BE, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, NL, NO, PL, PT, SI and SE, 
and the countries for North America include CA and US. Included industries cover 2-digit manufacturing and non-financial 
market services. Concentration metrics reflect the share of the top 8 firms in each industry (CR8). The graphs can be interpreted 
as the cumulated absolute changes in levels of sales concentration for the mean 2-digit sector within each region. For instance, 
in 2014 the mean (unweighted) European industry had 4 percentage point higher sales concentration than in 2000. Weighted 
figures reflect industry concentration weighted by the industry’s share in region total sales, such that larger industries are 
weighted more heavily.  
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Figure 8 
Differing Concentration Metrics (CR4, CR8, CR20) in Europe & North America 
Note: The countries for Europe include BE, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, NL, NO, PL, PT, SI, SE, and 
for North America include CA and US. Included industries cover 2-digit manufacturing and non-financial market services. 
Concentration metrics reflect the share of the top 4, top 8 and top 20 firms in each industry – unweighted metrics (CR4, 8 and 
20 respectively). To ensure comparability across different metrics, these now reflect proportional changes. The graphs can be 
interpreted as the cumulated percentage changes in levels of sales concentration for the mean 2-digit sector within each region. 
For instance, in 2014 the mean European industry had 20% higher CR4 sales concentration compared to 2000. 
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Figure 9 
Concentration for Manufacturing vs Services in Europe & North America 
Note: The countries for Europe include BE, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, NL, NO, PL, PT, SI, SE, and 
for North America include CA and US. Included industries cover 2-digit manufacturing and non-financial market services. 
Concentration metrics reflect the share of the top 8 firms in each industry (CR8). The graphs can be interpreted as the cumulated 
absolute changes in levels of sales concentration for the mean 2-digit sector within each region. For instance, in 2014 the mean 
European services industry had 4 percentage point higher sales concentration than in 2000.  
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Figure 10 
Concentration in Digital-Intensive vs Less Digital Industries in Europe & North 
America 
Note: The countries for Europe include BE, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, NL, NO, PL, PT, SI and SE, 
and the countries for North America include CA and US. Included industries cover 2-digit manufacturing and non-financial 
market services. Concentration metrics reflect the share of the top 8 firms in each industry (CR8). The graphs can be interpreted 
as the cumulated absolute changes in levels of sales concentration for the mean 2-digit sector within each region. For instance, 
in 2014 the mean European high digital intensity industry had 4 percentage point higher sales concentration than in 2000. The 
digital intensity of sectors is defined using the STAN A38 global digital intensity indicator of 2013-15 constructed by (Calvino 
et al., 2017).  
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Figure 11 
Impact of Industry Denominator Choice 
Note: The countries for Europe include BE, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, NL, NO, PL, PT, SI, SE. 
Included industries cover 2-digit manufacturing and non-financial market services. Concentration metrics reflect the share of 
the top 8 firms in each industry (CR8). The STAN denominator reflects our baseline preferred approach. The Orbis all 
denominator reflects the total sales of all firms in that industry in Orbis. The Orbis top 100 denominator reflects the total sales 
of the top 100 firms in that industry in Orbis. To ensure comparability across measures based on different denominators, the 
graphs reflect proportional changes. The graphs can be interpreted as the cumulated percentage changes in levels of sales 
concentration for the mean 2-digit sector within each region. For instance, based on the STAN denominator, the mean European 
industry had in 2014 16% higher sales concentration compared to 2000.  
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Figure 12 
Impact of the Account Selection 
Note: The countries for Europe include BE, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, NL, NO, PL, PT, SI and SE, 
and the countries for North America include CA and US. Included industries cover 2-digit manufacturing and non-financial 
market services. Concentration metrics reflect the share of the top 8 firms in each industry (CR8). The graphs can be interpreted 
as the cumulated absolute changes in levels of sales concentration for the mean 2-digit sector within each region. Using the 
apportioning (baseline) approach, the mean North American industry had 7 percentage point higher sales concentration in 2014 
compared to 2006. The baseline case apportions group output based on corrected Orbis-Worldscope-Zephyr data. 
“Unconsolidated only” represents the simplest approach, neglect business groups and focus only on individual firms. 
“Consolidated preferred” includes both the activity of the business group and other firm subsidiaries.  
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Figure 13 
Impact of Scaling Accounts to Match Group Consolidated Accounts 
Note: The countries for Europe include BE, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, NL, NO, PL, PT, SI and SE, 
and the countries for North America include CA and US. Included industries cover 2-digit manufacturing and non-financial 
market services. Concentration metrics reflect the share of the top 8 firms in each industry (CR8). The graphs can be interpreted 
as the cumulated absolute changes in levels of sales concentration for the mean 2-digit sector within each region. For instance, 
using the baseline approach, the mean North American industry had 8 percentage point higher sales concentration in 2014 
compared to 2000. The baseline case scales subsidiary sales down if needed to ensure that they do not exceed the group 
consolidated sales. “No scaling” represents the approach without such correction. “Scaling down and up” involves scaling 
subsidiary sales in either direction to match group consolidated sales. 
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Figure 14 
Impact of Data Cleaning 
Note: The countries for Europe include BE, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, NL, NO, PL, PT, SI and SE, 
and the countries for North America include CA and US. Included industries cover 2-digit manufacturing and non-financial 
market services. Concentration metrics reflect the share of the top 8 firms in each industry (CR8). The graphs can be interpreted 
as the cumulated absolute changes in levels of sales concentration for the mean 2-digit sector within each region. For instance, 
using the apportioning (baseline) approach, the mean North American industry had 8 percentage point higher sales 
concentration in 2014 compared to 2000. The baseline case is based on the corrected Orbis ownership and Orbis-Worldscope 
financial information. “Uncorrected ownership and financials” is based on the original ownership and financial information in 
Orbis. “Uncorrected ownership” is based on the corrected Orbis-Worldscope financial information but on original Orbis 
ownership data. 
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Figure A1 
Direct and Indirect Ownership 
Source: BvD Orbis User Guide 
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Appendix A 
Data 
Overview of MultiProd data 
The appendix provides a quick overview of the MultiProd dataset. Further detailed information 
on the MultiProd project and the methodology adopted can be found in Berlingieri et al. 
(2017a). 
The analysis conducted in this note relies on the work undertaken in the last few years 
within the OECD “MultiProd” project. The implementation of the MultiProd project is based 
on a standardised STATA® routine that micro-aggregates micro-data from production surveys 
and business registers, via a distributed microdata analysis. This methodology was pioneered 
in the early 2000s in a series of cross-country projects on firm demographics and productivity 
(Bartelsman et al., 2005; Bartelsman et al., 2009). The OECD currently follows this approach 
in three ongoing projects: MultiProd, DynEmp, and MicroBeRD.28 The distributed micro-data 
analysis involves running a common code in a decentralised manner by representatives in 
national statistical agencies or experts in public institutions, who have access to the national 
micro-level data. At this stage, micro-aggregated data are generated by the centrally designed, 
but locally executed, program codes, which are then sent back for comparative cross-country 
analysis to the OECD. 
The advantages of this novel data collection methodology are manifold: it puts a lower 
burden on national statistical agencies and limits running costs for such endeavours. 
Importantly, it also overcomes the confidentiality constraints of directly using national micro-
level statistical database, while at the same time achieving a high degree of harmonisation and 
comparability across countries, sectors, and over time. 
The MultiProd program relies on two main data sources in each country. First, 
administrative data or production surveys (PS), which contain all the variables needed for the 
analysis of productivity but may be limited to a sample of firms. Second, a business register 
(BR), which contains a more limited set of variables but for the entire population of firms. The 
program works also in the absence of a business register and this is not needed when 
28
 MultiProd, DynEmp, and MicroBeRD are projects carried forward by the Directorate for 
Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) at the OECD. The DynEmp (Dynamics of 
Employment) project provides harmonised micro-aggregated data to analyse employment 
dynamics (find out more: http://www.oecd.org/sti/dynemp.htm) and MicroBeRD provides 
information on R&D activity in firms from official business R&D surveys (find out more: 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm). 
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administrative data on the full population of firms are available. However, when data come 
from a PS, its availability substantially improves the representativeness of results and, thus, 
their comparability across countries. 
Census and administrative data, indeed, normally cover the whole population of 
businesses with at least one employee. Still, these datasets do not always exist and PS data need 
to be used. One of the big challenges of working with firm-level production surveys is that the 
selected sample of firms might yield a partial and biased picture of the economy. Whenever 
available, BRs, which typically contain the whole population of firms, are therefore used in 
MultiProd to compute a population structure by year-sector-size classes. This structure is then 
used to re-weight data contained in the PS in order to construct data that are as representative 
as possible of the whole population of firms and comparable across countries. 
At the time of writing, 20 countries have been successfully included in the MultiProd 
database (namely, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, 
Portugal, Switzerland and Sweden). For most countries the time period spans from early 2000s 
to 2012. For Chile, Austria and Switzerland the time horizon is shorter (starting in 2005, 2008 
and 2009 respectively), whereas for Finland, France, Japan and Norway data are available at 
least since 1995. 
MultiProd collects data for all sectors of the entire economy, whenever available. 
However, for the purposes of this analysis we have restricted our sample to the manufacturing 
and non-financial market services sector, as well as to European countries. Specifically, in this 
note we keep into account only European countries for which data are fully representative of 
the population of firms. The list includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. 
Overview of Orbis-Worldscope-Zephyr data 
We use the firm structure to apportion consolidated sales of the business group across 
subsidiaries. To do so requires reasonable coverage of both group and subsidiary financial 
information, as well as detailed ownership information detailing parent-subsidiary linkages. 
The group and subsidiary financial information is primarily sourced from Orbis, which is 
discussed in the first section below. We supplement Orbis with financial information from 
Worldscope for listed firms, which is discussed in the second section. The third section briefly 
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described the combined Orbis-Worldscope financial data. The final section covers the 
ownership information, which is obtained from Orbis, the Zephyr database on Mergers and 
Acquisitions and for the largest firms, spot checks of the group structure listed in their financial 
statements. 
Orbis financial data 
Orbis is the largest cross-country firm-level database that is available and accessible for 
economic and financial research. It is a commercial database provided to the OECD by the 
electronic publishing firm Bureau Van Dijk. 
To maximise the coverage of each firm’s subsidiaries, we use information for firms in 
all business sectors within Orbis and across 100 economies. Large firms may have subsidiaries 
spread across a variety of industries and economies. Our apportioning approach relies on 
reasonable coverage of these subsidiaries, so we include a very broad range of industries and 
economies. Specifically, we include 2-digit NACE rev.2 codes 1-82 – which reflects industries 
excluding public services. We include firm data from 100 economies, encompassing all 
economies with at least 500 firm-year observations or 500 merger and acquisition deals.29 This 
covers many more economies and industries than are often considered in Orbis analyses (see 
for instance, Andrews et al., 2016). The broad coverage allows a more complete picture of each 
firm’s subsidiaries than focusing on a narrower subset of industries or countries. 
The financial information primarily derives from company accounts, so some cleaning 
is required before using the data. We undertake a number of cleaning steps, closely following 
the suggestions by Kalemli-Ozcan, et al. (2015) and described in more detail in previous OECD 
analyses (Gal, 2013; Andrews et al., 2016). These include keeping accounts that refer to entire 
calendar year, dropping duplicate observations and removing outliers identified as implausible 
changes or ratios.  
29
 For completeness, the 100 economies included in the firm subsidiary analysis are: Albania, Algeria, Angola, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bermuda, Bosnia Herzegovina, Botswana, British Virgin Islands, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Kosovo, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,  Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep. of Korea, Rep. of Moldova, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, TFYR of Macedonia, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, UK, Uruguay, USA, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. 
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Financial information is available at different levels of aggregation within Orbis. 
Available information may be at the business group-level (“consolidated” or aggregated 
financial data consolidated across subsidiaries of the firm) and individual firm-level 
(“unconsolidated” information referring to an individual firm). As noted earlier, we use the 
firm structure to apportion consolidated group sales across their subsidiaries. To do so requires 
reasonable coverage of both business-group and individual subsidiaries’ financial information. 
We expand the coverage of Orbis data by using available unconsolidated information 
to infer missing consolidated information of the same firm and vice versa. Some firms have 
consolidated and unconsolidated information that is missing at different times. One concern 
may be that the trends in unconsolidated information is not reflective of trends of the wider 
consolidated accounts for these missing years. To ensure unconsolidated trends are a reasonable 
proxy, we require unconsolidated sales to be at least 50% of consolidated firm sales and 
therefore represent the bulk of firm activity (for the firm on average). Furthermore, we censor 
the unconsolidated trends at the 5th and 95th percentiles, so we do not use extreme growth of 
unconsolidated sales. Note we do not apply thresholds to using consolidated trends to fill in 
unconsolidated sales, since if unconsolidated sales are only a small proportion of consolidated 
sales any errors are unlikely to impact the group structure substantially. 
We tested the accuracy of this approach by examining its ability to predict our actual 
Orbis observations, setting half our actual observations to missing. Specifically, we randomly 
set half the actual consolidated Orbis observations to missing that also have unconsolidated 
information. We then use the unconsolidated sales growth rates to fill in the missing numbers 
and see how close the filled in and actual observations are. We find that our approach closely 
replicates actual Orbis observations: we find a 95% correlation of between the new series 
(which is 50% fitted) and actual sales. Therefore, our conservative approach to combining Orbis 
consolidated and unconsolidated data appears to be appropriate. 
Worldscope financial data 
It is possible to expand the coverage of our data by combining Worldscope and Orbis data using 
firm International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) numbers, which uniquely identify 
listed firms. We find that the majority of listed firms in Orbis are also in Worldscope (and vice 
versa). However, for some countries, such as the US, and some years, Worldscope is able to 
improve the coverage of the Orbis.  
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Worldscope is a cross-country firm-level commercial database of listed firms (Orbis 
also includes non-listed) provided to the OECD by Thomson Reuters. The firms in the data 
represent about 95% of global stock market capitalisation. Again, the financial information 
primarily derives from company accounts, so some cleaning is required before using the data. 
We apply the same cleaning rules to the Worldscope data as noted above for Orbis data. 
Worldscope reflects consolidated financial data (note Orbis also includes unconsolidated). 
For the same firm-years that are both in Orbis and Worldscope it is possible to compare 
the consolidated information in Orbis to the Worldscope data. This gives an idea of how 
comparable the two data sources are and whether combining the two sources is appropriate. 
We find that firm consolidated information in Orbis and Worldscope compare closely. 
Table A1 shows the distribution of differences between Orbis and Worldscope data. Most firms 
have very similar sales data in both Orbis and Worldscope, with 50% of firms having sales 
within approximately 5-7% in each data source and sales growth within 9-10% in each data 
(considering 25th and 75th percentiles in Table A1). There are few firms with very different 
sales in each data: 90% of firms have sales within approximately 29-34% in each data, and 
sales growth within 31%-50%. 
We supplement Orbis data with Worldscope in two ways: adding missing years for 
firms that are already in Orbis and adding missing firms that never have financial data in Orbis. 
The former involves using two data sources for the same firm at different points in time and so 
we take a more cautious approach, whereas the latter involves using only one. The first aspect 
of this conservative approach involves using sales growth rates (rather than levels) from 
Worldscope, to avoid jumps when the data source changes. The second aspect is to use growth 
rates only for firms that are sufficiently similar, with sales on average within 35% in the 
Worldscope and Orbis in the years when we observe them in both. This second aspect is 
designed to remove possible cases of matching the wrong firms in the two data sets.  
We tested the accuracy of this approach by examining its ability to predict our actual 
Orbis observations, setting half our actual observations to missing. Specifically, we randomly 
set half the actual Orbis observations to missing that are also present in Worldscope. We then 
use the sales growth rates in Worldscope to fill in the missing numbers and see how close the 
filled in and actual observations are. We find that our approach closely replicates actual Orbis 
observations: we find a 99% correlation of between the new series (which is 50% fitted) and 
actual sales. Therefore, our conservative approach to combining Worldscope and Orbis data 
appears to be appropriate. 
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Supplementing Orbis with Worldscope leads to improved coverage, in particular for 
North America in earlier years. Table A2 summarises the number of firm-year observations 
gained by including Worldscope data. For all regions there are non-trivial increases in coverage 
(of listed firms in Worldscope), however, this is particularly the case for North America. Orbis 
is known to have poorer coverage for the US, and we find this is the case before 2007 (see 
Bajgar et al., forthcoming). Since these listed firms are often large, adding Worldscope 
therefore substantially improves the ability to measure concentration in North America. 
Orbis-Worldscope financial information 
The combined Orbis-Worldscope firm financial data allows measures of concentration at the 
level of 2-digit NACE rev.2 industries and at world regions. We plan to compute country-level 
metrics in the next steps of this work. One caveat is our data currently has poorer coverage of 
subsidiary-level information for US firms. Note this is not the case for US business-group level 
information, since Orbis and Worldscope appear to cover close to the universe of listed firms. 
However, this limitation is something we wish to improve as a next step. 
We report trends only for better-covered economies and industries, since Worldscope 
reflects only listed firms and the coverage of Orbis varies by country, industry and over time 
(see Bajgar et al., forthcoming). We present concentration metrics for manufacturing and non-
financial market services (excluding 19 – Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products, 
68 – Real estate activities and 70 – Activities of head offices; management consultancy 
activities).30 However, recall a much broader set of industries is included in the underlying 
calculation. 
For similar data comparability reasons, we present analyses for Europe and North 
America. We include the years 2000-2014 for 21 economies. We include them and complete 
the information for the leading firms from other sources (e.g. annual reports). The metrics for 
Europe are based on Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and 
the UK, and those for North America reflect the US and Canada. However, recall a much 
broader set of countries is included in the underlying calculation. 
30
 For North America we also exclude 14 – Manufacture of wearing apparel, 15 - Manufacture of leather and 
related products and 30 - Manufacture of other transport equipment. 
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Orbis-Zephyr ownership information 
Our primary source of ownership information is Orbis, which we supplement with data on the 
Zephyr database of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). The data are both provided by Bureau 
Van Dijk (BvD) and share a common firm identifier, which allows us to merge the two datasets. 
Orbis contains comprehensive information on ownership linkages between firms, which has 
been extensively used in the academic literature (e.g. Cravino and Levchenko, 2017), however 
the data primarily start in 2007 and sometimes much later for some firms. Our primary use of 
the Zephyr M&A database is to measure earlier changes in ownership, enabling the 
construction of a series starting as early as 2000 for some firms. 
Orbis contains information on both ownership linkages between shareholders and 
subsidiaries and the global ultimate owners of subsidiaries calculated at each calendar year end. 
There are ownership linkages since the early 1990s, but coverage is better from 2007 onwards 
– we use all linkages available to us. The global ultimate owner is available at each year end
2007 to 2016 and is calculated by BvD. 
There are different definitions of global ultimate owner, depending upon the minimum 
ownership percentage (25.01% or 50.01%) or the type of ultimate owner (reflecting either firms 
or also individuals). Since our interest is in measuring firm concentration, we consider firm-
type ultimate owners.31 We focus on the 50.01% ownership criteria since this is a commonly 
used threshold for the definition of control of another firm and hence whether the subsidiary 
financials are consolidated into the parent accounts32. 
To calculate ultimate owners, BvD use the tree of ownership linkages for each firm, 
every year. They identify each firm’s immediate shareholders, then their shareholders’ 
shareholders and so on. So for each firm, they start at the bottom and work up their tree of 
ownership linkages until they find a shareholder that is independent (not controlled by anyone) 
or controlled by an individual. That shareholder is classified as the ultimate owner of the 
31
 Note that the firm-type ultimate owners include industrial, financial and insurance companies and banks. This 
definition excludes individuals, as well as mutual and pension funds, foundation and research institutes, public / 
state owners, employees/managers/directors, self-ownership, private equity firms, unnamed shareholders, venture 
capital or hedge funds.  
32
 For example, a majority of voting rights is often a sufficient condition for control under international accounting 
practices. Whilst we do not observe voting rights, we assume these are reflected in shareholder ownership 
percentages, such that a majority (50.01%) of shares reflects a majority of voting rights. This is clearly a first-
order approximation. For example, some shares can carry more voting rights than others and some types of shares 
have no voting rights at all. In addition, definitions of control can vary across accounting practices and having a 
minority of the voting rights can still imply de facto control if the remaining shares are spread across a large 
number of parties. 
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subsidiary firm at the bottom of the tree (further details are included in the Orbis Ownership 
Guide).  
We use the ultimate owner defined using the 50.01% minimum ownership percentage. 
Importantly, the minimum ownership criteria applies to both direct ownership linkages and 
indirect ownership linkages. It is possible to control a firm with more than 50.01% indirect 
shareholding, even though direct shareholdings are beneath this threshold. The example on 
Figure A1 highlights the difference between indirect and direct linkages. Mister X directly 
owns 100% of firms B and C, but indirectly owns 100% of A (=50% + 50%), through firm B 
and C. 
Whilst ultimate ownership data starts in 2007 in theory, for many firms it is not 
available until later years. The partial and improving coverage over time can generate severe 
challenges for researchers. 
Common approaches in the literature are either to assume that firms without an Orbis 
ultimate owner are independent or to take data from a recent year - assuming ownership has 
not changed over time. Both of these approaches are problematic. With increasing coverage in 
Orbis ownership over time the former approach will falsely equate missing data with 
independence and lead to an overstatement of ownership changes over time. The latter approach 
will clearly lead to an understatement of ownership changes over time and will typically 
overstate the number of markets and countries in which a firm operates. Whilst other 
researchers have noted the improving coverage over time, these issues are further complicated 
by churning in the data, with many living firms leaving the ownership data each year. We find 
that approximately 50,000-100,000 firms enter the Orbis ownership sample each year, and 
around 25,000-40,000 leave each year.  
We complement the rich ultimate ownership data of Orbis with ownership changes 
identified from the Zephyr M&A database and or Orbis historic ownership linkages. The 
ownership information in Orbis is particularly large - approximately 116million subsidiaries 
have some ownership linkage information in the OECD’s 2017_1 version of Orbis. Zephyr 
allows us to identify missing ownership changes, particularly for these earlier years. Zephyr 
contains deal-level information on M&As from 1997 for European firms, from 2000 for North 
America and global deals from 2003. Given our focus on Europe and North America, this 
constrains our analysis to 2000. Zephyr contains about 1.4million M&A deals from 2000 to 
2016. 
We undertake several steps to expand the coverage: 
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o A first step is to use Zephyr to identify changes in immediate (rather than global
ultimate) owners not available from Orbis. 
 For each deal, Zephyr contains information on the target, acquiror and
vendor firms. About 890,000 deals represent either changes in majority
ownership – such as a firm increasing from 10% to 51% equity
ownership - or a majority owner further increasing their stake – such as
a firm increasing from 51% to 60% ownership.
 Both types of deal allow us to identify the immediate owner of each
target firm at the time of the deal.
 Furthermore, for changes in majority ownership, i.e. when the target firm
switches hands, the vendor firm represents the previous immediate
owner.
o A second step, is to undertake a similar exercise using Orbis historic ownership
linkages to identify changes in immediate owners no available from Orbis. 
 We use the (oddly named) “current” Orbis linkage table. Although there
are annual tables (2007-2015) containing direct linkage information, we
found this to be a subset of direct linkages in the “current” tables – with
older linkages pre-2007 excluded and some linkages in later years too.
Given our intention to extend ownership to earlier years, the current table
was preferred.
o A third step is to translate the changes in immediate owners (from the first two
steps above) to changes in ultimate ownership. 
 The immediate owner who acquired the target firm may not be the
ultimate owner. To find the ultimate owner we follow the same
procedure as BvD, noted above.
 We combine both Zephyr immediate ownership (from the preceding
paragraph) and available Orbis information on ownership linkages to
find the shareholders of the immediate owners, and the shareholders of
their shareholders and so on. We use a 50.01% criteria and continue until
we find a shareholder that is independent or controlled by an individual.
This final shareholder is deemed the ultimate owner.
 Note this step also corrects for firms in Orbis that are majority owned
according to Orbis ownership linkages, but are missing an ultimate
owner.
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o A fourth step is to impute missing years of ownership information and roll the
owner backwards and forwards until there was an M&A or change in ownership 
(from the steps above). 
 The additional information on ownership changes allows one to roll the
owner backwards until there was a change in owner, rather than simply
assuming a missing ultimate owner implies independence. In particular,
we roll-forward and backward known ultimate owners at specific points
in time.
 For example, if we know firm A has an ultimate owner of firm C in 2010,
and from Zephyr M&A data that target firm A was acquired in 2008, we
can roll backwards the ultimate ownership until 2008. Moreover, in
about half of cases we know that target firm A was acquired from vendor
firm B in 2008, so we infer that firm A was the (immediate) owner of
firm B, and roll back further until an earlier M&A transaction.
 The first three steps above, supplementing the ultimate ownership in
Orbis with changes in ownership identified by M&As or changes in
immediate ownership (via Orbis historic ownership linkages) adds
approximately 400,000 firm observations each year. The fourth step
above, rolling backward and forward the ownership adds approximately
1 million firm observations each year.
We also undertake an extensive array of cleaning steps to identify and correct potential 
issues in the ownership data –focused towards identifying missing linkages amongst the largest 
firms. Spot-checking revealed that some large firm groups are missing ownership linkages for 
some years between the parent firm and their subsidiaries. This can be problematic because it 
can lead to a double counting of group activity, with both the parent’s consolidated financials 
and their subsidiary information included as separate groups. Accordingly, we undertake the 
following checks to mitigate this risk: 
o First, we correct ultimate owners that are in fact majority owned by another firm,
since by definition they cannot be an ultimate owner. 
o Second, we remove temporary (one or two year) changes in ultimate owner that
reverse themselves – as this seems highly unlikely to occur in reality. 
o Third, to detect missing linkages we examine large firms that change from having
no subsidiaries to a large number of subsidiaries from one year to the next. 
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o Fourth, to identify missing links we examine large firms that never have any
subsidiaries and the opposite case, large groups of subsidiaries that never have 
a parent with financials.  
o Fifth, we identify missing links where there are ownership changes amongst
firms have very similar names and are so very likely part of the same group all 
along (e.g. ABC Motors acquired by ABC Motors Thailand).  
o Finally, we manually check 300 of the very largest firms, using the subsidiary
structure listed in their financial statements each year to cross-check against the 
resulting ownership data. 
These ownership checks each correct a differing number of firms. The first two steps 
correct only around 5,000 firms per year. Almost all firms that are themselves ultimate owners 
are not majority owned by another firm (although they may be owned by an individual as noted 
earlier), and there are few changes in ultimate ownership that reverse themselves so quickly33. 
The third step uses the panel structure of the data to identify potential missing 
ownership linkages by using changes in subsidiary structure for large firms. Spot checking 
revealed cases of intermediate holding companies (that often are without financials) being 
temporarily incorrectly identified as the ultimate owner, rather than the true parent firm. To 
address this, we examine large groups of subsidiaries (in terms of sales) that have no parent 
with financials, but switch to a new parent the following period that does have financials34. We 
exclude cases of M&As as identified by Zephyr and consider only cases where more than 90% 
of subsidiaries transfer to the new parent.  
We find 7000 cases of this per year, and correct the 2000 largest groups. For 200 
groups with sales above 1 billion Euros we manually inspect each group against their financial 
statements and find 85% need correcting, 10% are correct and 5% are unknown. For the next 
1800 largest groups with sales above 100 million Euros, we use a name-matching algorithm to 
semi-automate identification of whether the prior owner was in fact a holding company of the 
new parent and then manually inspect each of the close matches35. We considered those with 
very similar names part of the same group and we correct 850 of these groups. 
33
 Spot checking some of these cases revealed these were all data anomalies. 
34
 We also considered groups of subsidiaries losing parents with financials, but there were few cases of this due to 
improving Orbis coverage over time. 
35
 All 1800 resulting name matches were visually inspected for additional verification. 
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The fourth step builds on the step above, identifying large groups of subsidiaries that 
never have a parent with financials, and large parents that never have subsidiaries. We found 
1500 parents with sales of more than 1billion Euros that never have subsidiaries, and 300 
groups of subsidiaries with more than 1billion Euros of sales that never have a parent with 
financials. Again, we use a name-matching algorithm to semi-automate identification of 
whether the prior owner was in fact a holding company of the new parent. We treated those 
with very similar names part of the same group, and consequently, we correct approximately 
700 groups per year. 
The fifth step considers any ownership change where the owners have a similar root 
to their name, e.g. XYZ Inc, XYZ Plc. By definition these remaining firms are not large, or do 
not have completely missing subsidiaries, or they would have been encompassed in the earlier 
cleaning steps. Accordingly these are somewhat less problematic for the resulting concentration 
metrics. Given this reduced risk and the fact that all firms in the data are considered as part of 
this step, we undertake an automated check using name matching and require an identical match 
of the cleaned name. We remove common company type abbreviations (e.g. Plc, Ltd, SA, 
Gmbh etc.), country names (e.g. ABC (Viet Nam) Ltd) and punctuation, and require the 
resulting root of the name to be identical. This corrects approximately 400 groups per year, but 
these are not often large. 
Finally, we manually check 300 cases of the largest groups against the subsidiaries 
listed in their financial statements. These groups have been identified through unusual 
ownership changes, strange trends in group sales or are disproportionately large for their 
industry. Approximately 50% of these required some form of correction to their data, although 
sometimes half of these cases are simply timing issues between ownership and financial 
changes, for instance, resulting from a divestment. 
With 116 million subsidiaries in Orbis ownership, the potential set of firms for which 
this exercise could be conducted is enormous. To make the exercise more feasible we restrict 
the ownership correction to: 
o Firms which either have more than 20 employees or more than 2million Euros
annual sales in Orbis (on average). 
o And/or firms which are ever in Worldscope.
o And/or firms which are ever are engaged in an M&A within Zephyr as an
acquiror, vendor or target; 
o And/or firms which ever hold a patent – identified using the OECD Patstat-Orbis
bridge – see Squicciarini and Dernis (2013). 
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o For the years that the firm is alive (i.e. after their year of birth and up to their year
of death) 
This results in corrected ultimate ownership for 2.8 million firms for the period 2000-
2016. For the (small) firms that fall outside this exercise, we use the uncorrected Orbis ultimate 
owner information. The corrections lead to a substantial gain in the number of firms for which 
it is possible to identify their ultimate owner. The number of firms with a global ultimate owner 
in the original uncorrected Orbis data and post-corrections above are shown in Table A3. 
The corrected ownership shows some reduction in sample size in the early 2000s, 
partly because fewer firms have been born at that point, and partly because of our conservative 
approach to inferring ownership in earlier years. For example, we roll back the ultimate owner 
to earlier years up to the point of an M&A change in ownership. For years before that point we 
use (the ultimate owner of) the vendor, or, if the vendor is unknown or is an individual, we set 
the ownership to missing for these years. 
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Appendix B 
Overview of MultiProd and Orbis-Worldscope-Zephyr Data 
We construct two complementary measures of concentration: using representative firm-level 
data from the OECD MultiProd project and business group-level data from Orbis-Worldscope-
Zephyr data. 
The MultiProd data has the unique advantage of being representative firm-level data 
that has been constructed comparably across countries. The MultiProd project is based on a 
standardised STATA® code that aggregates micro-data from national statistical offices. In 
cases where the micro-data is limited to a sample of firms, rather than the entire population, the 
data are re-weighted using business registers so they are representative of the whole population 
of firms. For the purposes of this analysis we restrict our MultiProd sample to the 
manufacturing and non-financial market services sector, as well as to European countries. We 
keep only European countries for which data are fully representative of the population of firms. 
The list includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Norway, 
Portugal and Sweden. For most countries, the time period spans from early 2000s to 2012. For 
Austria the time horizon is shorter (starting in 2008), whereas for Finland, France and Norway 
data are available at least since 1995. 
The Orbis-Worldscope-Zephyr data has the major advantage that we are able to 
construct business-group level measures of concentration across countries. Enterprise-level 
measures, such as those underlying MultiProd, may understate concentration if many 
enterprises are actually part of the same group.36 To measure business group-level activity 
requires both group and subsidiary financial information, as well as detailed ownership 
information detailing parent-subsidiary linkages.  
The business group and subsidiary financial information is primarily sourced from 
Orbis, which we supplement with Worldscope data for listed firms (Orbis includes both listed 
and non-listed). Orbis is the largest cross-country firm-level database that is available for 
economic research and has been widely used in OECD research (e.g. Andrews et al., 2016; 
36
 In this paper, we interchangeably refer to enterprises and to firms, treating them as synonyms. In both cases we 
have in mind registered legal entities (e.g. a UK retailer). Enterprises/firms can operate at multiple locations and 
therefore by definition consist of multiple establishments (e.g. branches of a UK retailer). We use business groups 
to mean corporate groups and consist of all subsidiary firms that share a common parent firm (e.g. a multinational 
retailer may control several subsidiary firms, such as domestic and foreign retailers, banks, logistics firms etc.). 
Note that for many smaller entities in our sample there is no such distinction, the enterprise and the parent firm are 
equivalent (i.e. they are single-firm groups). 
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Calligaris et al., 2018). It is a commercial database provided to the OECD by Bureau Van Dijk. 
Worldscope is a cross-country firm-level commercial database of listed firms provided to the 
OECD by Thomson Reuters. The firms in Worldscope represent about 95% of global stock 
market capitalisation. To capture the activity of all major subsidiaries of the group, a broad 
range of countries and industries is required. Our resulting subsidiary data contains information 
across 100 economies and all business sectors, from 2000-2014. 
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Appendix C 
Broader Ongoing Work on Competition, Innovation and Productivity 
This paper forms one part of a broader theme of work on competition, innovation and 
productivity being conducted within the context of the Global Forum on Productivity, Inclusive 
Growth, Going Digital horizontal project and the CIIE. 
The ongoing research assesses changes in the competitive environment by presenting a 
broad range of metrics at the level of firms, business-groups and industries. Existing ongoing 
projects in collaboration with STI presents evidence across a range of measures that include 
firm and business-group industry concentration, common ownership of firms, firm profitability, 
firm mark-ups, business dynamism, entry into innovation, innovation concentration.  
The research also outlines several possible drivers of changes in the competitive 
environments, including the digital transformation, mergers and acquisitions (M&As), venture 
capital and start-up accelerators, the growing importance of intangibles including patents, as 
well as competition, tax, intellectual property, innovation and entrepreneurship policies.  
Continuing research examines the impact of changes in the competitive environment 
across a range of firm and industry outcomes. These include firm productivity and productivity 
diffusion, laggard firms, productivity-wage differentials across firms, profitability, tax 
revenues and the nature and quality of innovation. 
The specific projects contributing to these different aspects are detailed below: 
 M&As, concentration and productivity is a project conducted under the Global
Forum on Productivity. It empirically examines the link between M&As, measures of
industry concentration and firm productivity growth and productivity diffusion. See the
scoping paper here.
 Industry Concentration in Europe and North America (this paper) presents
summary metrics on firm-level and business-group-level concentration across
industries, countries and regions, examining the role of digital sectors in particular.
 M&As and innovation is a project conducted under the horizontal Going Digital
project. It empirically investigates how M&As affect concentration of and entry into
innovation, and how they impact the level, the quality and the location of firms’
innovative activity. See the scoping paper here.
 Mark-ups in the digital era is a study which explores the evolution of firm mark-ups
across countries and the role of the digital transformation, innovation and intangibles in
driving these trends. An older version of this paper is available here.
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 Firm characteristics and CIT payments: Micro-level evidence is a forthcoming
study conducted under the horizontal Going Digital project. It examines the link
between concentration and firm profitability and tax revenues.
 Business dynamics and digitalisation is a forthcoming study under the horizontal
Going Digital project which analyses the how different facets of the digital
transformation affect business dynamics across countries.
 Declining business dynamism: evidence and causes is a forthcoming study which
points to some key mechanisms and policies that may be associated with the observed
trends in business dynamism across countries.
 Last but not least: laggard firms, technology diffusion and its structural and policy
determinants is a forthcoming study which documents characteristics of the least
productive firms, examines their potential for productivity growth and explores the role
of structural and policy determinants in their catch-up.
 The Productivity-Wage Premium: Does Size Still Matter in a Service Economy? is
a study based on data from the MultiProd project presenting evidence that, in services,
the most productive firms are not necessarily the largest ones in terms of employment
but they do pay the highest wages. The paper is available here.
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